2 the relation between pro-life issues and issues of economic and political justice and their response to the sex abuse crisis contradict key aspects of Christian love and thus seriously undermine the social contribution of Christian love that Caritas in Veritate seeks to promote.
Charity in the Encyclical
The encyclical begins with several ringing affirmations about the role of charity in shaping the Christian response to urgent social issues that mark in our increasingly integrated global society. Arguing that "charity is at the heart of the Church's social doctrine," Benedict XVI sees charity the source of the virtues of courage and generosity that are needed to sustain Christian "engagement in the field of justice and peace." The encyclical does not hesitate to describe charity as a political virtue that works to enhance the quality not only of "microrelationships (with friends, with family members or within small groups) but also macrorelationships (social, economic, and political ones)." (C in V, nos. 1-2.) It affirms that this political form of charity is just as fully Christian as that form that serves the neighbor in direct encounter (C in V, no. 7).
The encyclical makes strong claims that charity is a norm appropriate to the public life of our contemporary pluralistic world by arguing that it is an "authentic expression of humanity" (C in V, no. 3.) Charity encourages us to promote the deepest requirements of human nature and our true humanity. Action shaped by charity will also lead to the realization of the common good of a truly human society. The requirements of charity, therefore, include respect human nature as this has been discovered through the authentic use of human reason. Therefore those who are not Christian should be able to recognize the important role of charity in public life.
At the same time, the encyclical also argues that the deepest meaning of charity can only be known from the standpoint of Christian faith, which enables us to see God's love for us as gratuitous and beyond anything we deserve. It is, first of all, "creative love"-a love that led God freely and graciously to create the world, the human race, and each individual human being.
It is "redemptive love," though which sinful human beings are have been recreated in Christ and the Holy Spirit. Charity understood in this light is above all a form of love that freely and graciously gives-God giving us being through our creation, and giving us new being through forgiveness and recreation. The encyclical repeatedly describes charity as gift, as grace, and as gratuitous. There can be no doubt, therefore, that Benedict XVI's social thought begins from and remains deeply rooted in the creative and redeeming love God has for human beings in and through Jesus Christ.
Starting from this theological understanding of charity as seen in God's love for humanity, the Pope moves on to a consideration of the ethical implications of charity for social, economic, and political life. Accepting the gift of God gratuitously given in Jesus Christ empowers humans to become authentically open towards their brothers and sisters and thus capable of working effectively for the solidarity so sorely needed in our world (C in V, no. 78).
The encyclical speaks of how the experience of the gratuitous love of God leads men and women to give the gift of love to others. This gift creates bonds of fraternity and solidarity. Achieving these bonds of unity will go beyond the demands of justice in market exchanges and even beyond what reason tells us is required by our humanity. (See C in V, nos. 6 and 19.) Though justice is presupposed by love, charity as gratuitous concern for one neighbor transcends justice and makes it possible. Repeatedly the pope speaks of the indispensible contributions of charity as gift, grace, and gratuity for the development of the relations of unity, solidarity and even communion needed to heal our hurting world (C in V, no. 6).
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This emphasis on how charity-as-gift can contribute to solidarity today is surely important. Clearly we need moral and spiritual forces that go beyond the pursuit of narrowly defined self-interest within the global economy. I want suggest, however, that the encyclical's interpretation of charity as a gratuitous gift is not the only possible interpretation of its meaning.
Also, linking charity with gift in an almost exclusive way carries some significant dangers and an understanding that includes other important dimensions of Christian love can counteract these dangers.
The ethical expression of Christian love among humans includes but is not restricted to gratuitous giving by one human being to another. Love as gracious, even undeserved, giving is surely one way that humans can imitate the love God has for them in their interpersonal and social relations with each other. Perhaps the fullest expressions of charity as gift are the forgiveness that a person or community offers to another who has oppressed them, or the selfsacrifice that leads one person or community to surrender its own well being on behalf another. There is a serious risk, however, if Christian love is seen preeminently as a form of selfgift or self-sacrifice that transcends the requirements of justice, especially if this transcendence is interpreted to mean that love could call for surrender to injustice. Christian love does not require the issuing of a "blank check" that leads to submission to exploitation. 1 "justice is inseparable from charity" (See C in V, no. 6.). In the encyclical, however, this affirmation of the link between charity and justice is preceded by the statement that "charity transcends justice and completes it in the logic of giving and forgiving" (C in V, no. 6.). The precedence granted to charity over justice risks downplaying the work of justice to a lower spiritual plane than the love-as-gift that the encyclical strongly and repeatedly stresses.
In addition, Christian love can also be a positive, reciprocal relation like the mutual concern that exists among friends-love as mutuality or solidarity. The encyclical points to this form of love when it describes charity as a form of communion. Significantly, it adds that such communion can and should exist within public life, including its economic sectors. This will happen when solidarity among the members of society builds the common good (C in V, no. 36).
In order for the unity that can be achieved in social life to be a genuine form of solidarity it must be fully reciprocal. And this reciprocity requires equality. Charity as a gratuitous gift, however, calls neither for the equality nor the reciprocity that is essential to solidarity. Indeed it risks seeing charity as a stance taken by a superior or more powerful donor to a subordinate or weaker recipient.
Since love as mutuality requires equality and reciprocity, one can ask whether the encyclical's interpretation of love-as-gift will support the social and structural innovations required in a world marked by steep inequalities in both power and wealth. The encyclical clearly wants to affirm the importance of the structural changes needed for development. But in stressing that charity "transcends every law of justice" (C in V, no. 34) and by failing carefully consider the way Christian love calls for both equal regard and reciprocal mutuality, it downplays those aspects of love that are most important in the quest for structural change. One can also ask, therefore, whether the encyclical's approach to the relation of love and justice is consistent, and whether its approach is adequate for addressing some key practical matters on the development agenda today, including the alleviation of poverty in developing countries. I wish now to turn to those questions.
Practical Implications for Overcoming Poverty
The encyclical strongly advocates social changes that will help alleviate poverty in the developing world. Efforts aimed at overcoming poverty, of course, require addressing current patterns of trade, finance, investment, and development assistance. In the interest of brevity, only development assistance will be considered here as an illustration of this larger agenda, and this will be primarily in light of the encyclical's approach to the relation of love and justice.
There are significant voices today that strongly support development assistance or aid as a key element in efforts to address global poverty. For example, the leaders of most nations of the world, at a 2002 UN conference on financing development at Monterrey, Mexico, reached consensus that developed countries should continue to set 0.7 % of GNP as their target for development aid to poor countries. At the same time, however, the effectiveness of aid as a remedy for poverty has also been challenged by a number of analysts. Some have argued that aid creates dependency in the peoples who receive it, reducing incentives for actions by poor countries themselves that would enhance development through increased trade and investment. Aid is also seen as encouraging corruption by giving corrupt leaders resources they need to stay in power, which leads to continuing poverty and, in turn, to further aid. Because aid puts large pots of money at the disposal of the government in power, it also increases the incentive to use violent force to keep power, or to seize it if one is out of power, thus making civil war more likely. Thus some have argued that aid should be replaced by market-based initiatives such as trade, enhanced foreign direct investment, and support for micro-finance that enables the poor to participate in the market. 3 Such critiques of aid contain a number of elements of truth. Purely market-based responses to poverty, however, overlook the failure of the market-oriented structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and early 1990s. 4 They fail to attend to the likelihood that, in the face of the present global financial crisis, poor countries are less attractive sites for direct foreign investment and less able to enter into global trade markets. Calls for the abolition of aid also fail to give adequate attention to the effectiveness of some aid programs, such as aid targeted on the alleviation of the effects of HIV-AIDS, other health needs, and educational programs. 5 People who are sick or illiterate will simply be left out of whatever growth and development occurs.
Pope Benedict recognized this when he stated directly that "the worldwide financial breakdown has . . . shown the error of the assumption that the market is capable of regulating itself, apart from public intervention and the support of internalized moral standards." Therefore development policy, both public and private, should aim to make governments more accountable and to increase the participation of the poor in both the economic and political life of the society being assisted. In countries where corruption is widespread, this will mean placing conditions on aid to prevent it from simply ending up in the pockets of the ruling elite. Further, since civil conflict and lack of development can be closely linked in poor nations, efforts to prevent internal conflicts and civil war must be central in development strategy. 8 Work for development in such contexts will require political and diplomatic efforts to address the roots of conflict and to prevent it.
These matters raise significant questions about the adequacy of Caritas in Veritate's stress on charity as a gift relationship that goes beyond the requirements of justice and equality.
Overcoming the corrupt misuse of development aid that has caused some to call for the abolition of aid altogether will require creating structures of accountability that seek to guarantee that aid actually benefits the poor. It means that assistance must be seen as a two way street in which conditions are placed on the behavior of the leaders of recipient nations as a condition for the aid itself. Aid provided purely as gift risks reinforcing patterns of governance that can further entrench poverty rather than helping to overcome it. An ethic based on love as equal regard expressed in justice, therefore, rather than charity as gift, will be needed to determine whether assistance is really benefiting those it seeks to aid.
An ethic of love as reciprocal mutuality that supports genuine solidarity is needed to shape institutions of accountability that work to prevent the irresponsible behavior of too many governments in the developing world today. Clearly, the encyclical is aware that aid can create dependency and reinforce governmental domination of the poor in developing nations and it urges that we find ways to avoid this (C in V, no. 58.). It can be questioned, however, whether the encyclical's understanding of the relation of love to justice is adequate to this task.
Further, an African commentator has noted that the gratuitousness, gift, and affective social relationships stressed by the encyclical bear remarkable a resemblance to the personalized and patronage-based systems that have led too many African governments to fall into patterns of corruption, bribery, and tribalism. 9 What is needed in these countries is not more gift-giving, but an increase of efficiency, accountability and the rule of law. Moving in that direction will require an approach based on love as equal regard and reciprocity, those forms of love that require and come to expression when norms of justice shape social, economic, and political institutions. These standards of justice are far from being met by a number of developing countries, including quite a few in Africa. Implementing these norms of justice, rather than transcending them in a spirit of gift or gratuitousness, is the key challenge of development in these countries. Whether the encyclical is entirely self-consistent in the way it advocates both the requirements of justice and the spirit of gift and gratuitousness is unclear. In any case, a stronger argument is needed that Christian love of neighbor itself requires institutions shaped by these standards of justice. Regrettably, when a one cardinal criticized another for minimizing the seriousness of the sex abuse crisis he was told that such criticism was the responsibility solely of the Pope. To appeal to the hierarchical structure of the church in this way, and to suggest that only criticism from above is appropriate, is to substitute the dynamics of a Renaissance court for the demands of Christian love. 14 It is far from the communion and solidarity found in a just community.
Inadequate If this interpretation of the data on church departures is even partly correct, then the church needs to work more vigorously at a fuller and deeper realization of the requirements of justice in the way it exercises its ministry, in the style it follows in developing and communicating its teachings, and in the way it deals with the failures of its own members and clergy. Regrettably, in the present context the call of Caritas in Veritate to focus on how the gospel transcends the requirements of reason, justice, and equality could be heard as a call to move in the wrong direction. It is my hope that a renewed stress on how the gospel of love requires unwavering commitment to justice and a solidarity based on reciprocal equality will help avoid that outcome and thus strengthen the life of the church both in its own inner life and in its mission to a world that so deeply needs to hear the good news of the gospel.
importance consequences for an array of issues. The Kenyan people, however, approved the new constitution on by an approximately two to one margin. 13 Aristotle stresses that not seeking more precision and certitude than is possible is a characteristic of good reasoning in the moral domain. See Nicomachean Ethics, Book One, 3. 
